Abstract. We analyze the least increment function, a convex function of n variables associated to an n-person cooperative game. Several dual representations of cooperative games are proposed in [3, 4] . Chronologically, the …rst one is the indirect function [3], which is closely related to the conjugation theory of discrete convex analysis. The maximum average value function [4] constitutes another dual representation of a (nontrivial nonnegative) cooperative game by a convex function but, unlike the indirect function, which faithfully represents any game, the maximum average value function requires total balancedness of the game for the full validity of the duality relations. The least increment function shares with the maximum average value function the fact that it only preserves all the information on the game if the game is totally balanced.
Introduction
A cooperative game is a pair (N; v) ; where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a …nite set and v : 2 N ! R is a function satisfying the condition v(;) = 0. Given a game (N; v) and a coalition S N , the subgame (S; v) is obtained by restricting v to 2 S . To every coalition S N is associated its characteristic vector 1 S 2 f0; 1g n ; where 1 S (i) = 1 if i 2 S; and 1 S (i) = 0 if i = 2 S: In view of economic applications, it is convenient to distinguish between pro…t games and cost games. Since the de…nitions of most concepts relative to games depend on whether the game in question is regarded as a pro…t or a cost game, one should make that distinction explicit at a formal level. To this aim one can rede…ne, in a more rigorous way, a game as a pair (v; ) consisting of a function v : 2 N ! R and a sign 2 f1; 1g indicating whether the game is a pro…t ( = 1) or a cost ( = 1) game. Even though we adopt this point of view, we shall always identify the game (v; ) with v; and shall distinguish between pro…t and cost games by explicitly mentioning the type. When the type will not be mentioned, we shall be referring to games that may be of either type.
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For a cost game c : 2 N ! R and a pro…t game v : 2 N ! R we de…ne the polyhedra P (c) = fx 2 R n : x(S) c(S) for all S N g ; P (v) = fx 2 R n : x(S) v(S) for all S N g ; C(c) = fx 2 P (c) : x(N ) = c(N )g ; C(v) = fx 2 P (v) : x(N ) = v(N )g ; where x (S) = h1 S ; xi = P i2S x i : Note that P (c) 6 = ; if and only if c (;) 0; and P (v) 6 = ; if and only if v (;) 0: Thus, the polyhedra P (c) and P (v) associated to pro…t and cost games c and v; respectively, are nonempty. The polyhedra C(c) and C(v) are called the cores of the respective games. Games with a nonempty core are called balanced games. A game is totally balanced if each subgame is balanced. A useful reference for these concepts is [6] .
For C R n ; we denote by bd C its boundary, and by N (C; x) = fx 2 R n : hx ; y xi 0 for all y 2 Cg its normal cone at x 2 R n : Notice that if there are no supporting hyperplanes to C through x, then N (C; x) = f0g :
For a function ' : C R n ! R; we consider the convex conjugate function
; given by (see [7] )
and its subdi¤erential at x 2 C :
@f (x) = fx 2 R n : f (y) f (x) hx ; y xi for all y 2 Cg :
The indirect function
In this section we study a representation of n-person cooperative games by functions of n variables. As in [3] , where this representation was introduced, we shall restrict the presentation to pro…t games; of course, a parallel theory can be developed for cost games:
The indirect function admits an economic interpretation. Let us regard the players of the pro…t game as workers, and v(S) as the pro…t (measured in money units) that coalition S yields when its members work together, provided that they have available the resources needed for production. Suppose that an employer, owning these resources, wishes to choose those workers who would provide him with the maximum possible pro…t. If the subset S is selected then the total amount of money that S will yield is v(S). If x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) is the vector of (possibly negative) salaries demanded by the workers then v (x) represents the maximum net pro…t the employer can obtain under those given salaries.
Theorem 2.1. Let v : 2 N ! R be a pro…t game. Then, for all S N; one has
The importance of the preceding theorem lies in that it shows that the indirect function v of a pro…t game v contains all the information on the game, as it allows to recover v from v :
Indirect functions of pro…t games are characterized in [3] by three properties, two of which are expressed in terms of the convex analytic subdi¤erential:
There exists a pro…t game v : 2 N ! R such that = v if and only if satis…es the following properties:
The following alternative characterization of indirect functions in terms of gradients, instead of subdi¤erentials, was given in [4] . (1) is convex.
(2) The range of r is f 1; 0g n :
Many concepts in the theory of cooperative pro…t games can be easily expressed in terms of indirect functions; we refer the reader for details to [3] . In particular, totally balanced (pro…t) games, an important class of games that will be dealt with in the subsequent sections, are characterized by their indirect functions in [5] .
The least increment function
This section is devoted to a di¤erent way of representing pro…t games by convex functions, namely, by the so-called least increment functions. The interested reader can adapt this representation to the case of cost games. Since y x implies y(N ) x(N ) 0; we obtain v (x) 0 for all x 2 R n : Notice also that P (v) 1 v (0): To prove the reverse inclusion, suppose that v (x) = 0: Then P i2N (y i x i ) = 0 for some y 2 P (v) such that y x; and hence x = y: This establishes
The least increment function admits the following interpretation. Suppose that a payo¤ vector x 2 R n is o¤ered to the players. Then v (x) is the least amount y(N ) x(N ) by which the total payo¤ x(N ) should be incremented to make the resulting payo¤ vector acceptable by all coalitions (y(S) v(S) for all S N ) and preferred to the initial one by all players (y x): 
Proof. The duality theorem of linear programming implies
According to the preceding de…nition, the least increment function is the optimum value function of A parametric linear programming problem. Using the duality theorem of linear programming, it easily follows that, like the indirect function, the least increment function is a polyhedral convex function. The following proposition compares both functions.
Proposition 3.2. If v : 2
N ! R is a pro…t game then, for all x 2 R n ;
Proof. For each S N and for each y 2 P (v) such that y x; we have
and therefore
Example 3.2. Let us consider N = f1; 2g and v : 2 N ! R given by v(;) = 0; v(f1g) = v 1 ; v(f2g) = v 2 ; and v(f1; 2g) = v: We consider at …rst the case in which v 1 + v 2 v: For the polyhedron
there are the following boundary lines:
Then there are two extreme points (v 1 ; v v 1 ) and (v v 2 ; v 2 ) of P (v) : Furthermore, the core of v is the segment de…ned by these extreme points. Proposition 3.2 implies that
for all x = (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 2 : Taking suitable vectors in the boundary lines of P (v) ; we obtain
In the case v 1 + v 2 > v; the only extreme point of P (v) is (v 1 ; v 2 ) and the core of v is empty. Then the least increment function is given by
Shapley [8] introduced convex (pro…t) games as follows:
for all S; T N: A cost game c : 2 N ! R is concave if the reverse inequality holds. The function r c is related to P (c) by the min-max equation
which is an immediate consequence of the following generalization of the intersection theorem for polymatroids due to Edmonds [1] :
F 2 ! R be concave cost games. If there exists a set S 2 F 1 such that N n S 2 F 2 ; then we have
Moreover, if c 1 and c 2 are integer valued, then the maximum is attained by an integral vector.
Proof. See Fujishige [2, Theorem 4.9].
We shall next give a su¢ cient condition for the inequality in the preceding proposition to hold with the equal sign. Proof. The result follows from (3) applied to the concave cost game v:
v (x) = min fy(N ) x(N ) : y 2 P (v); y xg = min fy(N ) : y 2 P (v); y xg x(N ) = min fy(N ) :
A natural question to ask is whether the convexity assumption can be removed in the preceding theorem. In other words, do the indirect function and the least increment function of any pro…t game coincide? If this were the case, according to (1) the expression min fx (S) + v (x) : x 2 R n g would coincide with v(S) for any pro…t game and any coalition S: However, from the next theorem it follows that the equality v(S) = min fx (S) + v (x) : x 2 R n g is characteristic of totally balanced pro…t games. To give the de…nition of this class of games, we …rst need to recall the notion of x-balanced collection:
De…nition 3.5. A pro…t game v : 2 N ! R is totally balanced if for all S 2 2 N and all 1 S -balanced collection f T g T N it satis…es
The class of totally balanced pro…t games is closed under pointwise in…mum, that is, if fv i g i2I is an arbitrary nonempty family of totally balanced pro…t games then the pro…t game v : 2 N ! R de…ned by v(S) = inf i2I v i (S) for all S 2 2 N is totally balanced, too. Besides, any pro…t game v : 2 N ! R admits a totally balanced majorant, i.e., a totally balanced pro…t game w : 2 N ! R satisfying w(S) v(S) for all S 2 2 N Indeed, one can take, e.g., the (additive) game de…ned by w(S) = k jSj for all S 2 2 N ; with
In view of these properties, the following concept is well de…ned: We are now in a position to state the theorem announced above:
Theorem 3.7. For any pro…t game v : 2 N ! R, one has
Proof. Let x 2 R n : We recall that for the latter equality see Proposition 3.6.
In view of Theorem 3.7, one can say that the least increment function provides a dual representation of totally balanced pro…t games. Indeed, unlike the indirect function, the least increment function of an arbitrary pro…t game does not contain all the information on the game, but only on its totally balanced cover, since one can prove that pro…t games having the same totally balanced cover have also the same least increment function.
Based on Theorem 3.7, a plausible conjecture is that, even though indirect functions and least increment functions do not generally coincide, they do in the case of totally balanced pro…t games. However, the following example of a 4-players totally balanced (but not convex, of course) pro…t game shows that this conjecture is wrong. We consider the collection F = ff1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 3; 4gg and de…ne
Since P S N S 1 S = (1; 1; 1; 1=2) 1 N ; we obtain
In order to characterize least increment functions we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.8. Let C R n be a convex polyhedron with nonempty interior and let W R n n f0g be such that N (C; x) \ W 6 = ; for all x 2 bd C: Then there exist w i 2 W and r i 2 R; i = 1; :::; p; such that C = fx 2 R n : hx; w i i r i ; i = 1; :::; pg :
Proof. Let hx; x i i b i ; i = 1; :::; p; be a minimal system representing C; that is, 
which is a contradiction with the minimality of the representation of C: Thus there exists x i 2 R n such that x i ; x j < b i for all j 6 = i and hx i ; x i i b i : Since C has a nonempty interior, without loss of generality we can assume that hx i ; x i i = b i : Then x i 2 bd C: Let c 2 N (C; x i ) n f0g and d 2 R n be such that hd; x i i = 0: For su¢ ciently small 2 R; d; x j < b i x i ; x j and hence x i + d 2 C: Therefore hd; ci 0; which implies that hd; ci = 0: It thus follows that c = x i for some 2 R n f0g : Given that x i x i 2 C for small enough > 0; we have 0 h x i ; ci = h x i ; x i i = kx i k 2 ; so that > 0: We have thus proved that N (C; x i ) is the cone generated by x i ; so that i x i 2 W for some i > 0: The statement follows by setting w i = i x i and r i = i b i : Theorem 3.9. Let : R n ! R: There exists a pro…t game v : 2 N ! R such that = v if and only if satis…es the following properties:
n n f0g) 6 = ;; for all x 2 bd 1 (0) : Among the games v satisfying = v there is exactly one that is totally balanced, namely, the one de…ned by
Proof. Let us …rst assume that = v for some game v: Let x 2 R n : Then there exist nonnegative coe¢ cients f S g S N with P S N S 1 S 2 [0; 1] n such that the maximum in (2) is attained. For every y 2 R n we have
Thus P S N S 1 S 2 @ (x) ; and this proves property 1. To prove property 2, we de…ne ' : [ 1; 0] n ! R by ' (x ) = max fhx ; yi : y 2 P (v)g :
For every x 2 R n we have 
Since ' is convex, proper and lower semicontinuous, we have (x ) = ' (x ) = ' (x ) = hx ; yi for some y 2 P (v) = 1 (0) ; and hence
This inequality and (y) = 0 imply (x) (y) hx ; x yi for all x 2 R n :
Consequently x 2 @ (y) ; which proves property 2.
Since is nonnegative and takes the value 0 on the nonempty set P (v) ; we obtain property 3.
Properties 4 and 5 are immediate consequences of the equality 1 (0) = P (v) : To prove the converse, we asssume that satis…es properties 1-5 and de…ne the game v : 2 N ! R by
For every S N , we have 1 S 2 [ 1; 0] n . By property 2 there exists y 2
which is equivalent to
Therefore, for every S N; we obtain
Since v is the minimum game of a collection of additive games, we deduce that v is totally balanced. Notice also that for every x 2 [ 1; 0] n ; property 2 implies the existence of x 2 1 (0) such that (y) hx ; y xi for all y 2 R n :
This proves that
for all x 2 [ 1; 0] n : Let x 2 R n : We show that
By de…nition (x ) hx ; xi (x) for all x 2 R n ; and hence
It follows from property 1 that there exists x 0 2 [ 1; 0] n such that x 0 2 @ (x) : Then (x) hx 0 ; x yi + (y) for all y 2 R n ; which implies (x) hx 0 ; xi hx 0 ; yi for all y 2 1 (0) ; and therefore, by (5), (x) hx 0 ; xi (x 0 ) ; which, in view of (7), proves (6). We will next prove that
Since is a convex (by property 1) and continuous function (as it is a …nite-valued), by property 3 the set 1 (0) is closed and convex. Moreover, by (4),
To prove the reverse inclusion, suppose x = 2 1 (0) : Consequently, (x) > 0 and therefore, by properties 4 and 5 and Lemma 3.8, there exists S N such that h 1 S ; yi < h 1 S ; xi for all y 2 1 (0) : Since
we obtain v (S) = ( 1 S ) > x (S) and hence x = 2 P (v) : Thus, 1 (0) = P (v) is proved. Combining this equality with linear programming duality, we get for all x 2 R n : Therefore, Proposition 3.1 implies that = v : It only remains to prove the uniqueness of a totally balanced game satisfying = v : This follows from the fact that every totally balanced game is the minimum game of the collection of additive majorants, that is, v (S) = min fx (S) : x 2 P (v)g = min x (S) : x 2 1 (0)
for all S N; as this shows that v is determined by its least increment function :
We end this section by showing how the core of a pro…t game can be expressed in terms of its indirect function. 
